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Ampe: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Civil Procedure

CIVIL PROCEDURE
A.

Referee Recommendations are Unauthorizedwhen Unconfirmed by a
District CourtJudge

In one brief unanimous decision, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals recently invalidated five years worth of Ramsey County
referees' decisions. In Griffis v. Luban,2 the court struck down a
1995 standing order that automatically assigned referees to certain
cases in Ramsey County.3 The standing order, signed by thenActing Chief Judge Gordon Shumaker, applied to cases such as
default judgments, motions to vacate, forfeiture actions, name
changes and cancellations of a contract for deed.4 The purpose
behind "the standing order was to increase efficiency and improve
the procedures for processing uncontested matters."'
The standing order allowed for automatic case assignment to
referees and directed the court administrator to enter referee
recommendations without ajudge's signature. 6 The court decided
the chiefjudge had the power to assign matters to referees through
a standing order. However, the chiefjudge lacked the authority to
allow referee decisions to be entered without a district court
judge's confirmation. 8 As the Griffis decision was not applied
prospectively, potentially up to 10,000 Ramsey County referee
orders may be invalid.9
The validity of the standing order first arose when Katherine
1.

See Brian Becker, Many Ramsey Referee Orders Could be Invalid, MINN. LAW.,

Nov. 22, 1999, at 1.
2. 601 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
3. See id. at 715.
4. See Becker, supra note 1, at 9; see also Griffis, 601 N.W. 2d at 713.
5. Becker, supra note 1, at 9.
6. See Griffis, 601 N.W. 2d at 714-15.
7. See id. at 714. "[Tlhe legislature has given the chiefjudges of the district
courts broad administrative and assignment authority, which extends to assigning
referees.., and [the standing order as an assignment order] appears to be within
the scope of the administrative authority and assignment power of the chief
judge." Id.
8. See id. at 715.
9. See Becker, supra note 1, at 9.
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Griffis, an Alabama resident, brought a defamation claim against
Minnesota resident Marianne Luban.'0 The claim was brought in
Alabama district court and alleged "that Internet communications
by Luban damaged Griffis in Alabama."" Luban did not answer the
complaint and a defaultjudgment was entered against her." Griffis
filed the judgment in Ramsey County; Luban asserted the Alabama
District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and moved to
13
vacate.
Pursuant to the 1995 standing order, the case was assigned to a
referee. 14 In August 1998, the referee recommended the motion to
vacate be granted; Griffis moved for reconsideration and
amendment. Later Griffis also requested review by a district court
judge, and Luban requested that a district court judge sign the
referee's order. 16 Several months later, without a hearing, the
referee issued an order affirming the Alabama judgment.
In
March 1999, the court administrator entered the judgment against
Luban based upon the referee's order.'8 The referee's order was
not countersigned by a district courtjudge.' 9 Luban appealed from
the judgment.

The court of appeals examined the standing order issue.2' A
day or two before oral argument the appellate court clerk
22
contacted the attorneys, requesting a copy of the standing order.
At oral argument Luban's attorney requested the standing order
not be struck down, but if the court did strike it, to do so
prospectively. 23 The court declined to grant this request, ruled that
the referee's order was invalid due to lack of'judicial confirmation,

10.
11.
12.
13.

See Griffis, 601 N.W.2d at 713.
Id.
See id.
See id.

14. See id. at 713-14. Neither party objected to the referral. See id. at 714. Any
party can object to the assignment to a referee. See MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 107.
15. See Griffis, 601 N.W.2d at 714. Griffis also filed objections to the referee's
findings. See id; see also MINN. R. Civ, P. 53.05(b) (explaining that either party may
serve written objections to referee's report).
16. See Griffis, 601 N.W.2d at 714.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Becker, supra note 1, at 9.
23. See id.
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and vacated the case without reaching the merits. 14
The court reasoned that the standing order produced invalid
judgments as the chief judge who signed the order had no
authority to alter the system. 25 The court emphasized that referees
lack final decision authority, and that the referees'
recommendations only become orders of the court when
confirmed by a judge. 26 Neither party submitted authority showing
that the chief judge could abrogate the statutory requirement of
judicial countersignature on referee recommendations.27 While
one referee pilot project did allow for automatic referee
assignment for certain matters, this project explicitly retained the
requirement of judicial signature, indicating "the continuing
vitality of that requirement."
Because the 1995
was unauthorized, judgments
29
• order
•
• standing
entered under it were invalid.
Griffis will have to re-file the
judgment in Ramsey County before the Minnesota courts will have
the opportunity to hear this Internetjurisdiction landmark case.30
Because the standing order was not struck down prospectively,
the Griffis holding will have a broad impact. There appears to be
no reason why any Ramsey County referee decision, issued under
the standing order, could not come under attack based on GifiS32
However, Ramsey County has not yet seen excessive activity
resulting from G Zfis. However, one judge granted a motion to
quash and another vacated a monetary judgment of sanctions, both
apparently motivated by Criffis's treatment under the standing

24. See Griffis, 601 N.W.2d at 715-16.
25. See id. at 714-15.
26. See id. at 715. "Confirmation by a district court judge also establishes the
propriety of the initial referral to the referee." Id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 716.
30. Interview with C. Peter Erlinder, Council for Griffis and Professor of Law,
William Mitchell College of Law, in St. Paul, Minn. (Feb. 7, 2000). Luban has filed
bankruptcy, thus the case may be tied-up in bankruptcy court for some time. Id.
However, Erlinder indicated Griffis may forego monetary damages and seek only
an injunction, which will not be hindered by the bankruptcy proceeding and allow
the case to move forward. Id.
31. See Becker, supra note 1, at 9. " [ T ] he Griffis decision does not appear to
contain language limiting the reach of its holding." Id.
32. See id.
33. Telephone Interview with Michael Moriarity, Ramsey County Civil Court
Administrator (Feb. 17, 2000).
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order.3 4 Chief Judge Lawrence Cohen has amended the standing
order, which now requires district court judges to co-sign or
confirm all referee orders. 5
Thus future cases will not be
vulnerable to motions to vacate based on the faulty standing order.
B.

Appealable Orders
1.

Sanctions Order not Subject to Immediate Appeal

On June 14, 1999 the United States Supreme Court clarified a
disagreement between the federal appellate courts and ruled that a
36
sanctions order against an attorney is not immediately appealable.
In Cunningham v. Hamilton County, the Court held "that a
sanctions order imposed on an attorney is not a 'final decision'
under §1291" of the Judicial Code.3 7 The Court conceded that
some discovery sanctions are immediately appealable, but not those
sanctions that are "inextricably intertwined with the merits of the
action.,38 The Court further stated that the congruence of interests
between clients and attorneys implicates that attorneys should not
be treated as non-parties for purposes of appeal3 9
In Cunningham, the petitioner was an attorney representing
Darwin Starcher in a federal civil rights suit against Hamilton
County. During the course of discovery, which was overseen by a
magistrate
judge, 41 Cunningham failed to respond timely to
•
discovery requests. The magistratejudge ordered Cunningham to
comply. The magistrate judge also ordered that four witnesses be
34. See id.
35. See Becker, supra note 1, at 9.
36. See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 119 S. Ct. 1915, 1918 (1999).
Compare, e.g., Eastern Maico Distribs., Inc. v. Maico-Fahrzeugfabrik, 658 F.2d 944,
951 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that the order was not immediately appealable), with
Telluride Mgmt. Solutions, Inc. v. Telluride Inv. Group, 55 F.3d 463, 465 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that the order was immediately appealable).
37. See Cunningham, 199 S. Ct. at 1923; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994)
(vesting courts of appeals with jurisdiction over appeals from "final decisions").
38. See Cunningham, 199 S. Ct. at 1920-21.
39.
See id. at 1921. "[A] decision does not automatically become final merely
because it is directed at someone other than a plaintiff or defendant." Id. at 1920
n.4.
40. Seeid. at 1917.
41.
See id.
Starcher was served with requests for interrogatories and
documents, to which responses were due within 30 days after service; Cunningham
failed to comply with the requests. See id.; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 33(b) (3), 34(b)
(requiring prompt responses to requests).
42. See Cunningham, 199 S. Ct. at 1918.
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deposed on July 25, 1996, but only after Cunningham produced
"full and complete" responses to the discovery requests.43
Cunningham did not comply with these orders.
She failed to
produce the requested documents, gave incomplete responses to
several of the interrogatories, and noticed the deposition of one
witness before responding to the County's requests.
Hamilton County filed a motion for sanctions, which the
magistrate judge granted.4 6
The magistrate judge ordered
Cunningham to pay Hamilton County $1,494 for attorney's fees.47
The magistrate judge carefully noted that there was no contempt
hearing and that Cunningham had never been found in contempt
of court.48 The district court affirmed the sanctions order and
further granted a motion to disqualify Cunningham, as she was a
material witness in the case.49 Cunningham appealed.5 0
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction. 5' The court of appeals "considered whether the
sanctions order was immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine." 2 That doctrine provides exceptions to the final
judgment rule for orders that are "conclusive.. . resolve important
questions separate from the merits, and... are effectively
unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying
action. 53 The Sixth Circuit determined the issues here were not
separate from the merits, and that a non-participating attorney
must await final disposition of the underlying case before filing an
appeal.54

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals.
The
Court first examined the history of the final judgment rule, which
descended from the Judiciary Act of 1789.56 The rule's main
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (3) (stating that incomplete answers
are treated as a failure to disclose).
46. See Cunningham, 199 S. Ct. at 1918. The magistrate judge found
Cunningham's conduct "egregious." See id.

47.

See id.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1919.
See id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotes omitted).
See id.
See id. at 1923.
See id. at 1919.
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purposes are to "emphasize the deference that appellate courts owe
to the trial judge" and to avoid clogging the system with expensive
appeals filed for harassment purposes.' The Court noted that no
decision is final unless it "ends the litigation on the merits
58 and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.
The Court then examined the exceptions to the final
judgment rule. 59 The exceptions apply to "decisions that are
conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the
merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the
final judgment." 6 Hamilton County conceded that the sanctions
order was conclusive.6 However, the Court stated that appellate
review of a sanctions order cannot be completely separate from the
merits, as the sanctions order is often inextricably intertwined with
the merits of the action. 62 To determine if sanctions were proper
here, the Court would have to consider completeness of
interrogatory responses, which would require substantial inquiry
into the merits of the case.r3 Thus, the sanctions order does not fall
under the exception of a decision resolving important questions
separate from the merits.6
Even if the order were separate from the merits of the case, the
order must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final
judgment to qualify for exception.65 The Court concluded the
sanctions order was effectively reviewable. 66 The Court first struck
down Cunningham's
•
67 argument that a non-party generally cannot
appeal ajudgment. The Court explained that when the non-party
is an attorney whose personal interests in vindication are
subordinate to the client's interests, the decision to appeal depends
entirely on the client. 6s Thus the attorney should not be treated

57.
58.

See id. at 1919-20.
Id. at 1920 (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521-22

(1988)).
59. See Id.
60. Id. (quoting Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1921.
64. See id. at 1923.
65. See id. at 1921.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. "As a matter of professional ethics, however, the decision to appeal
should turn entirely on the client's interest." Id. (quoting Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1985)).
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the same as a non-party for the purpose of appeal.69
Cunningham next argued that sanctions are similar to
contempt orders, which are immediately appealable.'v The Court
clarified the difference between a sanction and a finding of
contempt.
The purpose of civil contempt is to "force the
contemnor to comply with an order of the court," while sanctions
are "not designed to compel compliance. " v7

Further, the purpose

of the sanction rule to "protect courts and opposing parties from
delaying or harassing tactics during the discovery process," would
be defeated by immediate appeal from a sanction. Judges could
forego sanctions, despite abusive conduct, to avoid further delay in
the proceeding. 4
The Court recognized the hardship their ruling could impose
on attorneys and offered possible solutions.7 5 The Court suggested
Congress could amend the Judicial Code to provide explicitly for
immediate appellate review of sanction orders. 76 Otherwise, a
district court could wait until the end of the trial to decide whether
to impose sanctions or when to order collection.7 v Justice Kennedy,
concurring, mentioned the P7ossibility of a writ of mandamus in
cases of exceptional hardship. 8
Thus, the Supreme Court has effectively overturned a long line
of Eighth Circuit decisions that held sanctions orders to be
immediately appealable. 7
Now attorneys must await a final
judgment in the underlying action before they may appeal
sanctions, as with most other discovery rulings.

69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Id. A civil contempt finding is immediately appealable because before
final judgment is reached, the non-party will have either given up information
sought or suffered incarceration or fines, which are probably irreparable harms.
See id. at 1922.
73. See id. "[Immediate appealability] also could forestall resolution of the
case as each new sanction would give rise to a new appeal." Id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1922-23.
76. See id. at 1923. Recent amendments have provided for immediate appeal
of certain orders. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79. SeeJosh Jacobson, Notes & Trends-FederalPractice,BENCH & B. OF MINN.,
Aug. 1999, at 55.
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2. Denial of Request for Reconsideration is not an Appealable Order
On January 1, 1999, new appellate rules became effective in
Minnesota that dramatically changed the timing and availability of
appeals.80 In Baker v. Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corp., the
Minnesota Court of Appeals clarified the application of the new
rules to post-trial motions.8 ' The new rules of appellate procedure
enumerate the Iost-trial motions that will toll the running of the
time to appeal. However, the rules specifically exclude motions
for reconsideration. 83
In Baker, David R. Baker sued Amtrak, alleging disabling back
84
injuries and impotence resulting from work-related incidents.
The jury found, on a special verdict form, that Baker was 95%
85
negligent and that Amtrak was 5% negligent.
The trial court
misread the jury's form and ordered judgment for Baker for ninetyfive percent of the total award8 6 The trial court discovered its error
and amended the award to reflect the jury's findings, leaving Baker
with only five percent of the total award.
Baker moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial. 8
The court denied Baker's motion. 89 Baker then submitted a
written request to make a motion for reconsideration of his posttrial motions, based on incidents that cast "suspicion on the jury's
verdict."90 The trial court refused to allow Baker to make the
motion for reconsideration, and Baker appealed from the final
judgment. 9'

Baker challenged the court's denial of his request to move for

80. See David F. Herr & Eric J. Magnuson, New Steps to Climb: Amendments to the
Appellate Rules, BENCH & B. OF MINN., Apr./May 1999, at 29; see also MINN. R. Civ.
APP. P. 104.01 (effectiveJan. 1, 1999).
81. See Baker v. Amtrak Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp., 588 N.W.2d 749, 755-56
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
82. See MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01.

83. See id. (advisory committee's note, 1998 amendments) (stating that the
rules exclude motions for reconsideration, because those motions are never
required and are considered only if the trial court permits the reconsideration
motion to be filed).

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Baker, 588 N.W.2d at 751-52.
See id. at 752.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/11

8

Ampe: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Civil Procedure
CIVIL PROCEDURE

2000]

1229

reconsideration of his post-trial motions.92 The court of appeals
ruled that the motion was not appealable under Minnesota Rules of
Appellate Procedure.93 The rules permit appeals only from orders
that, in effect, determine the action and prevent a judgment from
which an appeal might be taken.94 The court held that the denial
of Baker's request neither determined the action, nor prevented a
95
Thus the court
judgment from which Baker could appeal.
concluded, "the trial court's denial of Baker's
request
to bring a
96
motion to reconsider is not appealable."
The court then used the new Minnesota Appellate Rules to
97
The new rules enumerate specific
further support its ruling.
motions that will stop the clock from running on time to appeal
until those motions are decided. 9'
The list is meant to be
exhaustive. 99 Motions for reconsideration are explicitly excluded
because they are "never required by the rules and are considered
only if the trial court permits the motion to be filed."' 0 The
appellate court reasoned that if the new appellate rules provided a
reconsideration motion did not toll the running for the time to
appeal, then the reconsideration motion should not be
independently appealable. 1
The court decided that the moving party would not suffer
injustice from the denial of the motion to reconsider.1 2 Trial court
errors that would have been discovered upon reconsideration
92. See id. at 754. Prior to passage of the Minnesota Rule of General Practice
115.11 on January 1, 1998, motions to reconsider were not entertained. See id.
The new rule provides that motions to reconsider are allowed only by express
permission of the court, which will be granted only upon a showing of compelling
circumstances. SeeMINN. R. GEN. PRAcr. 115.11.

93. See Baker, 588 N.W.2d at 755. Amtrak argued Baker's request was not
reviewable as the trial court did not issue an order, but merely refused a hearing
request. See id. at 754. The court "decline[d] to deny review of the denial of
Baker's request... simply because the trial court did not respond in an order."
Id. at 755.

94.

See MINN. R. Civ. APp. P. 103.03

(e).

95. See Baker, 588 N.W.2d at 755.
96. Id.
97. See id. The court's conclusion is "consistent with a recent amendment to
MINN. R. Crv. App. P. 104.01" effective onJanuary 1,1999. Id.
98. See MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 104.01, subd. 2. The rule applies to motions for
JNOV, to amend or make findings of fact, to amend the judgment, and for new
trial. See id.
99. See id. (advisory committee cmt., 1998 amendments).
100.
101.
102.

Id.
See Baker, 588 N.W.2d at 756.
See id.
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would be corrected on appeal. 10
Also, errors relating to the
reconsideration motion could be corrected on an appeal from the
final judgment.
Furthermore, if the trial court made no
reversible error in its consideration of the case, its refusal to allow a
motion for reconsideration would be harmless. °5 By sparing a
distinct appeal, the new appellate rules serve to streamline the
appellate process by consolidating appeals, which aids judicial
economy.
C. JurisdictionPresent Over Discovery Proceedings Where the Main Case
is Pending in Another District
Recently the Eighth Circuit first confronted the issue of its
jurisdiction over a discovery order involving a non-party in an outof-district action. 0 6 In Miscellaneous Docket Matter #1 v. Miscellaneous
Docket Matter #2, the court of appeals claimed jurisdiction to review
an order to quash,
and ruled that the order was subject to
17
immediate appeal. 0
The plaintiffs in Miscellaneous Docket Matter filed a class action
suit against West Publishing Company (West) alleging. gender
discrimination in West's stock ownership program.
One
attorney, acting for several parties, filed one suit in Colorado
district court and another in Florida district court.0 9 All parties
agreed depositions taken in either case could be used in both
proceedings.' 0
Dwight Opperman, West's former CEO and a non-party to the
action, was fully deposed for two days in Colorado." West sent a
letter to the plaintiffs requesting that any questions relating to
either action be asked at the Colorado deposition, and pointed out
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require parties to avoid
imposing undue burdens. "' At the end of the second day the

103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Miscellaneous Docket Matter #1 v. Miscellaneous Docket Matter #2,
197 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1999).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 923-24.
109. See id. at 924.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 45 (c) (1).
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plaintiff's council concluded the deposition "in its entirety."" ma
However, plaintiffs sought to depose Opperman again.
Opperman filed a suit in Minnesota District Court seeking to quash
the subpoena under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45.'1
The district court granted his motion, "holding that another
deposition would constitute an undue burden and subject
Opperman to an invasion of privacy and embarrassment.""
To determine whether to grant the motion, the district court
balanced the plaintiffs' need for the information against
Opperman's burden." 7 The court found the planned areas of
inquiry were either entirely irrelevant, or of limited relevancy. Hs
Thus the plaintiffs' need for information was negligible." 9 The
court also found Opperman, as a non-party, was entitled to special
protection. 20 Additionally the court believed another deposition
would constitute undue burden, as appellants had the opportunity
to ask their questions at the Colorado deposition, but failed to do
121

SO.

The court of appeals first considered their jurisdiction over the
order.122 The court noted the general lack of immediate appeal of
discovery orders in pending cases. 12 However, the court concluded
that because the proceeding involved a non-party and the main
action was pending in a non-Eighth Circuit district court,
Opperman would have no other means to obtain appellate
review.124 Thus the court claimed jurisdiction over the ancillary
action. 125 The court cited only decisions from 1the
Ninth and Tenth
26
decision.
jurisdiction
its
supporting
in
Circuits
113. See MiscellaneousDocket Matter, 197 F.3d at 924.
114. See id. The second request was made pursuant to an alteration in a
protective order limiting the deposition question subject matter. See id. However,
the protective order had not forbidden the questions that the appellants sought to
ask in the second deposition. See id. at 927.
115. See id. at 924; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 26 (c) and 45 (c).
116. See MiscellaneousDocket Matter, 197 F.3d at 924.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. Seeid. at 925.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.; see also Hooker v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 903, 905
(10th Cir. 1992); In re Subpoena Served on California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 813
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The court reasoned that liberal discovery rules have high
potential for abuse, thus the rules confer broad discretion on the
district court in discovery matters."' The court of appeals agreed
with the district court that the proposed inquiry in the second
deposition was not relevant, and that Opperman had the burden to
show that his claim of harm must be based upon more than
"stereotypical and conclusory statements.', 12' The court decided
that Opperman had satisfied his burden, in part due to the
plaintiffs'
press releases accusing Opperman of sexual
harassment. 29 Furthermore, it noted that non-parties are subject to
unwanted burden, and are thus entitled to special deference when
balancing competing needs. 3
After considering the balance
between the plaintiffs' needs and Opperman's burden, the court of
appeals ruled that the 1district
court did not abuse its discretion in
31
quashing the subpoena.
As a result, the Eighth Circuit established its jurisdiction over
discovery orders involving non-parties to cases outside of the
district. I
It joins at least two other circuits in this area, and
provides additional protection to local non-parties involved in outstate disputes.
D. Formal Service of Summons Required to TriggerRemoval Clock
The U.S Supreme Court recently resolved a long-standing split
between the circuits as to whether formal service of process is a
prerequisite for the running of the thirty-day removal period under
28 U.S.C. section 1446 (b). " In Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe
Stringing, Inc., the Court held that the defendant's time to remove
is triggered by formal service of summons, and not by receipt of the
complaint without formal service. 3
Thus, faxing a copy of the
complaint, as the respondent did in Murphy Bros., is insufficient to

F.2d 1473, 1476 (9th Cir. 1987).
127. See MiscellaneousDocket Matter, 197 F.3d at 925.
128. See id. at 926.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Seeid. at 927.
132. See id. at 925.
133. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 1322,
1326 (1999); see also 28 U.S.C. §1446 (b) (1994) (providing that notice of removal
of a civil action shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant).
134. See Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1325.
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begin running the removal clock.1

In Murphy Bros., Michetti filed a complaint in Alabama State
Court on January 26, 1996, alleging breach of contract and fraud by
Murphy. 36 Michetti did not serve Murphy then, but on January 29,
1996 faxed a.-"courtesy
copy" of the complaint to one of Murphy's
137
vice presidents.
On March 13, 1996 Murphy removed to the
district court under 28 U.S.C. section 1441.
Michetti moved to
remand to state court on the ground that Murphy had filed the
removal notice too late.'
Section 1146 (b) requires notice of
removal to be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the
defendant,4 0"through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading."
The district court denied the remand motion, as it found the
removal R4eriod commenced upon official service of the
summons.
The court reasoned the language "or otherwise" in
the statute was not meant to govern in these situations. 142 The
district court certified the issue for interlocutory appeal, 143 and the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 1 4 The
court of appeals based
its ruling
on a ,,145
plain meaning interpretation
,,,
,
of the words "receipt" and "otherwise.
The court determined all
that was required to start the removal clock was for the defendant
to come into possession of the complaint by some means.146
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals'
reasoning. 47 It noted that in the absence of service of process,
courts may not exercise power over a party, and that service of a

135.
See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1326. The parties had attempted to settle until February 12,
1996, when Michetti officially served Murphy. See id.
138. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994) (governing removal from state to
federal district courts).
139.
See Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1326.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1146 (b) (1994).
141.
See Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1326.
142. See id.
143.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994) (allowing for immediate appeal when a
district judge states that an order involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation).
144. See Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1326.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1328.
147. See id.
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summons or some other authority-asserting measure was required
for one to officially become a party. 14 Furthermore, the Court
examined legislative history and determined the words "or
otherwise" in section 1446(b) were added solely to rectify a
problem posed by states such as New York, where an action
commenced upon service of the summons, which could precede
the filing of the complaint. 149 The Court found no evidence to
support the theory that Congress intended to dispense with service
of process as the official trigger for removal actions. 50 In addition,
the Court reasoned that if the plain meaning of the statute was so
clear, the circuits would not be so hopelessly split over its proper
interpretation. 1' The Court also noted that in other areas of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 152 "receipt through service or
otherwise" is interpreted consistently with its holding in Murphy
Bros.153

The dissenting justices, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, argued
that the plain meaning interpretation followed by the court of
appeals was proper. 154 They also pointed out that the Court's
practice of strictly construing removal statutes indicated a contrary
result. 1
In states like Minnesota, which require that the complaint be
served with the summons, the removal clock will •now
156 start to run
when summons and complaint are served together.
Service of a
"courtesy complaint" will not be sufficient to start the removal
clock.
JanetAmpe

148.

See id. at 1327.

149. See id. In such jurisdictions, the defendant would potentially have to
remove the suit before he even knew what the suit was about. See also S. REP. No.
303, at 6 (1949).
150. See Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1328.
151.
See id.

152. See e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 81(c) (specifying the time the defendant has to
answer a complaint after removal as being within 20 days after the receipt of a
copy of the initial pleading through service or otherwise).
153. See Murphy Bros., 119 S. Ct. at 1329.
154. See id. at 1330 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
155. See id.
156. See MINN. R. CIrv. P. 3.02 ("A copy of the complaint shall be served with
the summons.").
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